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NOTES
show, just as in any other nuisance suit, that the defendant's
activity was unreasonable under the circumstances of the par-
ticular case: he must prove a nuisance in fact. However, the
regulatory standards should be given great weight by the
Louisiana judiciary in determining liability in a nuisance
case, because the weighing process used by the administra-
tive agencies in developing these standards is very similar to
the judiciary's nuisance test. Also, the judiciary, in their de-
termination of the issues involved in a nuisance case, should
allow private litigants to take full advantage of the emission
data and the research data on the damages caused by pollut-
ants compiled under the authority of the Clean Air Act.
Randall C. Songy
IDENTITY: A NON-STATUTORY EXCEPTION TO OTHER CRIMES
EVIDENCE
Evidence that the accused committed crimes other than
the one being prosecuted usually is inadmissible1 because of
the inherent danger that the factfinder will convict the ac-
cused of the crime charged because he has a propensity to-
ward criminal conduct. However, the general prohibition is
subject to recognized exceptions 2 based on the independent
relevancy of other crimes evidence to material questions
other than the defendant's character or propensity toward
crime. 3 Admissibility under these exceptions is predicated on
a determination that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its inherently prejudicial effect on the accused. 4
1. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 184, 187 (Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK]; J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 202, 216, 305 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; see also Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of
Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938) [hereinafter
cited as Stone]; Comment, Louisiana Evidence: Relevant and Material As-
pects, 21 LOYOLA L. REV. 476 (1975).
2. MCCORMICK §§ 43, 190, 288; WIGMORE §§ 218, 305, 980. See, e.g., People
v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901) (listing the major common law
exceptions: knowledge, intent, plan, design, system, motive, emotion, and
identity). See also People v. Johnson, 228 N.Y. 332, 127 N.E. 186 (1920) (im-
peachment).
3. MCCORMICK §§ 184-85; Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in
Louisiana-To Show Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc., In the Case in Chief, 33
LA. L. REV. 614 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Other Crimes-I]; cf. FED. R.
EVID. 402, 403.
4. WIGMORE §§ 216, 416; Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A
1976] 1101
i 102 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36
In Louisiana, statutory exceptions to the general rule
excluding other crimes evidence 5 include evidence used to
impeach the credibility of witnesses, 6 evidence of other crimes
composing the res gestae,7 and evidence necessary to prove
knowledge, intent, or system. 8 The justifications for these
exceptions vary. Evidence of a witness's prior conviction is
admissible to test his credibility;9 the rule applies to defen-
dants who take the stand in precisely the same manner that
it applies to other witnesses. 10 Evidence of uncharged crimes
comprising part of the res gestae is received to inform the
jury fully of the circumstances surrounding the particular
crime charged,' including all acts, whether criminal or not,
forming a concomitant part of the criminal episode. Because
of its high probative value in establishing the defendant's
guilt with respect to the crime charged, evidence of other
criminal acts tending to establish the defendant's knowledge,
iritent, or system is allowed despite its inherent prejudice to
Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REv. 385 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Traut-
man].
5. Other Crimes-I at 621.
6. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 180 § 1 (au-
thorizes use of evidence of prior convictions to impeach a witness's credibil-
ity); State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 134 (La. 1973) (strictly construing the statu-
tory language to exclude all but evidence of convictions); Comment, Other
Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-To Attack the Credibility of the Defendant on
Cross-Examination, 33 LA. L. REv. 630 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Other
Crimes-II].
7. LA. R.S. 15:447-48 (1950) (makes admissible evidence of circumstances
incident to the criminal act as part of the res gestae); e.g., State v. O'Connor,
320 So. 2d 188 (La. 1975); State v. Mays, 315 So. 2d 766 (La. 1975); Comment,
Excited Utterances and Present Sense Impressions as Exceptions to the Hear-
say Rule in Louisiana, 29 LA. L. REV. 661 (1969).
8. LA. R.S. 15:445-46 (1950).
9. LA. R.S. 15:495 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 180 § 1. The
original intent underlying this provision was to limit the inquiry to the fact
of conviction. E.g., State v. Perkins, 248 La. 293, 178 So. 2d 255 (1965); but see
State v. Jackson, 307 So. 2d 604 (La. 1975) (details of prior crimes offered to
impeach may be inquired into for the purpose of establishing the true nature
of the offense; three Justices dissented and one concurred in the decree); see
generally Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence: Article VI of the Federal
Rules of Evidence: Witnesses, 36 LA. L. REV. 99, 116-20 (1975).
10. State v. Kelly, 271 So. 2d 870 (La. 1973); McCORMICK § 43 (The defen-
dant with a prior record can avoid the effect of this rule by not taking the
stand, but he is then denied the opportunity of personally presenting his side
of the story.).
11. MCCORMICK § 288; WIGMORE § 218; e.g., State v. O'Connor, 320 So. 2d
188 (La. 1975).
the accused. 12 To minimize undue prejudice, introduction of
other crimes evidence to establish knowledge, intent, or sys-
tem has been prohibited judicially unless the prosecution com-
plies with judicially imposed procedural prerequisites. 13
The existence of additional exceptions to the ban on other
crimes evidence is well documented at common law14 with at
least one, identity, being judicially recognized in Louisiana.' 5
The traditional common law view of identity as an exception
to the general rule excluding other crimes evidence is of a
limited nature. Under this exception, the modus operandi of
the crime charged and of the "other crime" sought to be
introduced must be identical' 6 and must possess a certain
uniqueness,' 7 so that the two crimes are conceived as the
handiwork of one criminal-equivalent in effect to a finger-
print or signature. Proof that an accused has committed a
"signature" crime identical with the crime under prosecution
is logically relevant to the issue of identity but is admissible
only when its probative value exceeds its prejudicial effect.' 8
12. Trautman at 387; Other Crimes-I at 615.
13. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973). The supreme court estab-
lished five procedural rules applicable when other crimes evidence is used to
establish knowledge, intent, or system. These rules require the state to fur-
nish notice before trial specifically stating the exception under which the
evidence is offered, and to establish that the evidence is neither merely
repetitive nor a subterfuge for attacking the defendant's character; they
further provide that the jury be instructed that the evidence is admitted for
limited purposes. The commitment of the court to these procedural rules
appears firm. State v. Brown, 318 So. 2d 24 (La. 1975); State v. Pearson, 296
So. 2d 316 (La. 1974); State v. Ghoram, 290 So. 2d 850 (La. 1974). Nevertheless
the court stated in State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975), that Prieur was
not to be applied in an overly technical manner and that good faith com-
pliance with the guidelines was sufficient.
14. MCCORMICK § 190; e.g., People v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286
(1901).
15. See State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975); State v. Jordan, 276 So.
2d 277 (La. 1973); State v. Wideman, 218 La. 860, 51 So. 2d 96 (1951); State v.
Fuselier, 174 La. 319, 140 So. 490 (1932); State v. Wales, 168 La. 322, 122 So. 52
(1929).
16. MCCORMICK § 190; E. MARJORIBANKS, FOR THE DEFENCE: THE LIFE
OF SIR EDWARD MARSHALL HALL at 312 (1929) (discussing the "bridges of the
bath" case, R. v. George Joseph Smith, 11 Cr. App. R. 229 (1915)).
17. People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233, 444 P.2d 91 (1968) (admissibility
depends on several factors considered alone or in combination: time of the
offenses, method of entrance, modus operandi, and the defendant's actual
presence at the scene of the crimes); WIGMORE § 411; cf. Other Crimes-I at
618 n.29.
18. See notes 4 & 12, supra.
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The "signature crimes" identity exception has been rec-
ognized by Louisiana courts. 19 For example, in State v.
Vince,20 the defendant was charged with rape; the Louisiana
Supreme Court approved the admission of testimony by two
prior rape victims showing that in each instance the defen-
dant had lulled them into a false sense of security with a
request for aid in finding his dog, led them to a clump of
bushes, raped them, and then asked for their jewelry. Appa-
rently the court was satisfied that the common modus
operandi in each case was sufficient to make these signature
crimes, since it sanctioned admission of the separate offenses
under the identical crimes exception. 21
Aside from cases involving "signature crimes," the iden-
tity exception has been construed by Louisiana courts to have
a second meaning. In instances in which alibi, mistaken iden-
tity,22 or other defenses which draw into question the iden-
tity23 of the perpetrator of the crime charged are raised or
likely to be raised, Louisiana courts have allowed other crimes
evidence to be introduced under a second so-called identity
exception to the general exclusionary rule.24 One means of
establishing identity is through the introduction of evidence
of similar crimes committed by the defendant which tend to
'19. State v. Vince, 305 So. 2d 916 (La. 1974); State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781
(La. 1973); State v. Jordan, 276 So. 2d 277 (La. 1973); State v. Modelist, 260 La.
945, 257 So. 2d 669 (1972); State v. Wideman, 218 La. 860, 51 So. 2d 96 (1951);
see also State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So. 2d 594 (1971); State v. Welch, 250
La. 719, 198 So. 2d 902 (1967); cf. Crook v. Henderson, 310 F. Supp. 200 (E.D.
La. 1970).
20. 305 So. 2d 916 (La. 1974).
21. Id. at 922. Cf. Other Crimes-I at 618 n.29. See also State v. Moore,
278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973) (factual similarities in separate rapes were not
sufficient to justify admission of evidence of one in prosecution for the other).
22. State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975) (the state was permitted to
show the familiarity of its witness with the defendant through evidence of
past illegal drug transactions); State v. Carter, 301 So. 2d 612 (La. 1974)
(identity proven through evidence of police officer's familiarity with the de-
fendant gained by observing prior burglaries with binoculars).
23. But see State v. Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1973) (not guilty plea does
not of itself put identity at issue).
24. State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975); State v. Carter, 301 So. 2d
612 (La. 1974); State v. Hicks, 301 So. 2d 357 (La. 1974); State v. Kibby, 294 So.
2d 196 (La. 1974); State v. Harrison, 291 So. 2d 782 (La. 1974); State v.
Reinhardt, 229 La. 673, 86 So. 2d 530 (1956); State v. Hicks, 180 La. 281, 156 So.
353 (1934); State v. Fuselier, 174 La. 319, 140 So. 490 (1932); State v. Wales, 168
La. 322, 122 So. 52 (1929).
1104 [Vol. 36
establish that he was the perpetrator of the crime charged.2 5
Identity may also be the basis for admission of other crimes
evidence when it is offered to establish the familiarity of the
state's witness with the defendant. For example, in State v.
Banks,26 the accused, charged with a narcotics violation, at-
tacked the ability of a state witness, an undercover police
officer, to remember and identify him as the perpetrator of
the crime under prosecution. On the basis of "identity" the
Louisiana Supreme Court approved admission 27 of other nar-
cotics violations to show the officer's familiarity with the par-
ticular accused and to rebut the defense of mistaken iden-
tity.28 No requirement of similarity 29 between the offense
charged and the other crime appears to exist, except that the
other crime must be relevant to the issue of the defendant's
identity as the perpetrator of the crime under prosecution.
Louisiana courts lack clear statutory authorization for
their formulations of the identity exception. 30 Specific refer-
ence to an identity exception is not found in Louisiana cases
until 1929, so despite the fact that the exception was already
strongly established in the common law jurisprudence, 31 its
omission from the 1928 Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure,
wherein the knowledge, intent, and system exceptions were
25. E.g., State v. Hicks, 180 La. 281, 156 So. 353 (1934); State v. Wales, 168
La. 322, 122 So. 52 (1929); WIGMORE § 306.
26. 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975).
27. Id. at 599.
28. Id. In a hypothetical case, the accused, charged with a narcotics
violation, attacks the ability of a police undercover officer to remember and
identify him as the perpetrator of the offense. It is suggested that the
officer's testimony as to his familiarity with the accused gained through theft
violations would be admitted under the analysis in State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d
594 (La. 1975).
29. E.g., State v. Reinhardt, 229 La. 673, 86 So. 2d 530 (1956) (gambling
and theft); State v. Wales, 168 La. 322, 122 So. 52 (1929) (bank robbery and
auto theft).
30. See State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 594, 603 (La. 1975) (Barham, J., dissent-
ing) (questions the propriety of allowing identity to be used as an exception
absent statutory authority). See also State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 128 (La.
1973) (stating the only exceptions to the other crimes exclusionary rule are
the statutory exceptions).
31. The first case in Louisiana recognizing an "identity exception" is
State v. Wales, 168 La. 322, 122 So. 52 (1929), although the common law had
recognized such an exception as early as 1901 in People v. Molineaux, 168
N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 293 (1901). See also Stone at 1026.
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first codified,3 2 is understandable. Why identity has not been
added to the Louisiana statutes as a basis for admission of
other crimes evidence is not determinable. Perhaps the appa-
rent nexus between the "signature" identity exception and
the system exception 33 was part of the reason for not codify-
ing the former. However, this explanation 34 does not justify
continued exclusion of the identity exception from the statu-
tory scheme, since when properly understood, both the iden-
tity and system exceptions refer to crimes closely related in
time, place, and manner 35 but systematic crimes make up part
of a greater scheme, 36 while other crimes bearing on identity
are not necessarily related to an overall plan. However, lack
of statutory recognition has not diminished the viability of
the identity exception.3 7 The unavoidable conclusion follows
that the identity exception as applied in Louisiana is an ex-
ception of equal stature with knowledge, intent, and system
though not statutorily approved. Because both the statutory
and the. jurisprudential exceptions to the general exclusion-
ary rule admit evidence inherently prejudicial to the ac-
cused, 38 evidence of other crimes offered to establish identity
should be subject to the same procedural prerequisites to
admissibility applicable to other crimes evidence offered to
show knowledge, intent, and system.3 9
Harry W. Sullivan, Jr.
32. State v. Hicks, 180 La. 281, 156 So. 353 (1934); State v. Fuselier, 174
La. 319, 140 So. 490 (1932); State v. Wales, 168 La. 322, 122 So. 52 (1929).
33. LA. R.S. 15:445, 446; State v. Spencer, 257 La. 670, 243 So. 2d 793 (La.
1971); MCCORMICK § 190; WIGMORE § 304.
34. MCCORMICK § 190.
35. Compare State v. Jordan, 276 So. 2d 277 (La. 1973) (identity) with
State v. Spencer, 243 So. 2d 793 (La. 1971) (system).
36. WIGMORE § 304; Other Crimes-I at 616.
37. State v. Banks, 307 So. 2d 594 (La. 1975); State v. Vince, 305 So. 2d 916
(La. 1974).
38. MCCORMICK § 190; People v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286
(1901). See also cases cited noted 24, supra.
39. See cases in note 13, supra.
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